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BOOK REVIEWS
Thomas E. Davitt, S.J.,* The Elements of Law: Little, Brown and
Company, Boston, 370 Pp., 1959.
What should a textbook in Philosophy of Law set out to do? The
major works of the last generation or more have generally taken one of
two approaches, both of which in any case are rather closely related to
each other. They have either been "Great Books"-type anthologies
which have sought to present in some detail the main ideas of the
leading juristic thinkers of the present and past ages, arranged
conveniently, as in Julius Stone's monumental "Province and
Function of Law" or for that matter Wolfgang Friedmann's "Legal
Theory", under broad functional classifications like Stone's three-
way analysis of the differing approaches to law as "logical", "phil-
osophical", and "sociological"; or else they have deliberately fo-
cussed, like Patterson's "Jurisprudence, Men and Ideas of the
Law", upon the Judicial Process, as the most important and inter-
esting locus of community policy-making from the viewpoint of the
law schools and legal profession, and sought to present the various
schools of legal thought seriatim-Positivism, Natural Law, Prag-
matism, Realism, Sociological Jurisprudence-treating these as
alternative or competing methodological approaches to legal doc-
trine to be appraised in terms of their usefulness or otherwise to
particular groups of judicial decision-makers in particular space-
time contexts rather than as ultimate ends in themselves. What we
have, then, in both cases, is an essentially eclectic form of jurispru-
dence which aims to present all schools of thought with equal em-
phasis and without any open commitment to any one school, except,
of course, in so far as the avoidance of absolutes and avoidance of
making a personal choice inevitably involves, in itself, acceptance
of something in the way of a pragmatic approach to values.
There is, of course, a third type of work in the field of Philoso-
phy of Law which does not fit into either of these two categories.
I refer to the sort of study represented by Judge Jerome Frank's
"Law and the Modern Mind" and "Courts on Trial" and Karl
Llewellyns "Bramble Bush", Lon Fuller's "Law in Quest of Itself",
Northrop's "The Complexity of Legal and Ethical Experience".
This type of work is normally highly opinionated and critical and
does not hesitate to commit itself in terms of Values and techniques
for Value-choice. It will normally become the source material, in
the future, for future "Great Books"-type anthologies of jurispru-
dence. But it does not purport to be a textbook for law school use,
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being written rather for the education of the law professors and the
legal profession generally than for the education of law schools;
and as an independent monograph-type study in itself can hardly
be made the basis for comparison with something designed essen-
tially as a textbook, as Father Davitt's present work is.
As a legal textbook, Father Davitt's study must be understood
in the light of several special factors. It is a text designed inten-
tionally for use in Catholic Law Schools or at least by students
with a background in Catholic philosophy and thinking on law
generally: hence the particular, four-way division of the subject
matter into "Man-made Law"; "Man-discovered Law"; "Integra-
tion of Man-made Law"; "Background of Law". Second, it is a
text designed as an introductory work on law-either for students
in college or graduate school or else for students in the earlier years
of law school,-a purpose that is undoubtedly greatly assisted by
a clarity and simplicity of style and formal presentation unusual
in a work on jurisprudence and by the wealth of illustrative detail
and concrete, field application of general philosophic principles. It
is the latter aspect of the work that perhaps calls for the most
notice for it both conflicts with generally accepted, North Ameri-
can stereotypes of Catholic studies on law and also enables, in a
very meaningful way, the drawing of comparisons and contrasts
with predominantly Protestant or non-sectarian American legal
doctrine.
For Father Davitt's is not a study of Catholic legal ideas in the
abstract-a set of ultimate principles or values divorced from
every-day application-but an empirically-based examination of
the main bodies of substantive law in the United States. These
bodies of substantive law are treated in their traditional, analytical
jurisprudence divisions of Constitutional Law, Crimes, Torts, Pro-
perty, Contracts, Equity; but it is a treatment in terms of the spe-
cial analytical skills and techniques of Catholic philosophy. This is
therefore no ivory-tower exercise in the postulation of a priori legal
principles, but, in accord with the best teachings of American legal
pragmatism, it is a demonstration of principles in action, in the
particular fact-complex of specific problem-situations. Methodo-
logically speaking, the fascinating aspect of Father Davitt's study,
to non-Catholic readers, will be his strong emphasis on legal tech-
niques; for he concentrates as much or more on the actual modes
of implementation of particular values in particular contexts as on
the values themselves. Thus in discussing the ambit of the consti-
tutional guarantee of Due Process he rightly recognizes that the
clause has never had a fixed and immutable content jelled for all
time, but that the constant principle has been a conception of a
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certain necessary relationship of Ends and Means: "In spite of
fluctuations in the interpretations of due process caused by the
inevitable tensions betwen private and public claims and differing
socio-economic influences, the steady guide has been the norm of
the means-end relationships." (p. 162). Again, in the same discus-
sion, he specifically recognizes the process of interest-balancing-
of weighing interests advanced by the parties in particular problem-
situations against other, countervailing interests, whether private
or public-that is at the core of American judicial decision-making,
whether in the Due Process area or more generally, when he notes
that Due Process has "come to mean a method by which private
versus public claims may be decided and balanced in substantive
law". (p. 162). And I find this same pervasive emphasis in Father
Davitt's suggestion that Government be viewed as "Prudence"
rather than as "Science", and in his correlative definition of "Pru-
dence" as the "habit of rightly directing means to end. The habit
of mind by which a man deliberates, evaluates and decides what
means are actually to be used in best attaining an end and directs
his actions accordingly. . . ." (p. 313).
All this, of course, is very close to the dominant methodological
emphasis in American legal pragmatism at the present day. The
acceptance of law as a process of reconciliation or choice between
conflicting claims or interests is the main teaching of the American
Sociological school. The lack of concentration upon ultimate values
in law and the concomitant unwillingness on the part of the leaders
of the Realist and Sociological schools to provide definite criteria
in advance for guiding the judicial choice between competing values
-in effect the failure to attempt any firm ranking of values and
to set up, so to speak, a hierarchy of values-need not necessarily
reflect either an insensitiveness to moral issues in law or an intel-
lectual incompetence to debate specific problems in moral terms.
I think it is clear, if one looks to the works of the leaders of prag-
matic thought in American law in the post-war years, that many of
the "apparent deficiencies for which Catholic thinkers have occa-
sionally criticized them stem from a certain intellectual humility
that itself stems from an awareness that many, if not all, the great
disputes that have rent our democratic society in North America
in modern times have been less disputes over ultimate values than
disputes over alternative modes of social control, over alternative
methods of realizing and achieving agreed social purposes. The
judge who prefers to rest his decision, in a great constitutional
cause cgl1bre, on consideration, against a background of social facts,
of concrete techniques actually utilized by executive-legislative
authority to implement community interests in particular cases,
1960-61]
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may, so far from being timid, simply recognize the merits of mak-
ing an ally of time and, by deciding the case narrowly on the facts,
allow the opportunity for further public debate and the give-and-
take and reconciliation, through time, that that normally involves.
This particular thought, I think, lies behind Mr. Justice Holmes'
conception of "truth" in the democratic society, as the "power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market",
(Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)) ; and it seems to me, also,
to be at the kernel of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's technique-oriented
philosophy of judicial self-restraint which owes intellectual debts,
of course, to Brandeis and ultimately to Holmes himself. And
Frankfurter, and through him Holmes too, would on this interpre-
tation of the pragmatist judicial tradition in the United States, be
less interested in a skepticist's deriding of other people's absolutes,
as some Catholic writers have perhaps tended too easily to assume
than in an opening up of the possibilities of fruitful reconciliation
of competing partisan positions through centering the discussion
first on those aspects of a problem on which there can always be
room for confession of error-considerations of means, of machinery
devices for implementation of ultimate values.
In the period, immediately before his untimely death in 1957,
when he was mapping out for himself a program of creative
intellectual activity for the next decade or so ahead, the late Judge
Jerome Frank concluded that the main needs of American philoso-
phy of law in the emerging 1960's would lie in comparative, eclec-
tic, "integrative" jurisprudence that could try to synthesise the
main bodies of autonomous, apparently competing, philosophy in
American society; and it was his feeling in this regard that, in par-
ticular, the gap between American legal pragmatism and American
Catholic thought on law was more apparent than real. I know,
from conversations with Judge Frank, that he was impressed with
the similarities in methodology of these two bodies of thought; as
indeed I have been myself, as one trained in the Pragmatist-Realist-
Sociological tradition, on delving into St. Thomas and Catholic
secondary writings. Is the barrier, which the occasionally splenetic
exchanges in the law reviews have sometimes highlighted, a result
of unnecessary misconceptions-on the one hand that Catholic
legal thought is a closed body of dogma that is quite unyielding as
to choice of modes of application, and on the other hand that the
Pragmatist school's failure to articulate its value position repre-
sents a necessary hostility to all systems of thought resting on
ultimate, (articulated) value premises? Would it be so surprising
to find that in the one society, North America, after all, agreement
could frequently, if not usually, be reached, even on value-choice,
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in given problem-situations, between the two bodies of thought?
This latter question, of course, will properly be answered by em-
pirically-based studies directed to tension areas like the relationship
of Church and State in released-time programs, State financial
aid to education, control of blasphemy and obscenity in the com-
munication industry, and similar problems. Meanwhile Father Da-
vitt, though directing himself, as noted, specifically to introductory
students and students with a Catholic background, has, I think,
managed to render a clear and objective interpretation of much of
the dominant thoughtways-the distinctive skills of thinking and
the specialized techniques-of American law at the present day,
meaning essentially the Pragmatist-Realist-Sociological approach
to law as the dominant body of thinking in American law at the
present day. And in achieving this for Catholic students of law in
the United States, Father Davitt has at the same time afforded non-
Catholic lawyers with an opportunity for introducing themselves
to much of the distinctive modes of thought of Catholic lawyers,
thereby facilitating the process of "integration" of jurisprudence to
which Judge Jerome Frank gave such high priority.
EDWARD MCWHINNEY
Faculty of Law, University of Toronto
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